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In recent decades significant advances have taken place in our 
understanding of deterrence behavior, particularly in the pure theory of dyadic 
nuclear threats However, when observing the empirical international deterrence 
system, current theory suffers from a number of defects The purpose of this 
paper is to stimulate discussion about the shortcomings of existing nuclear 
deterrence theory, together with some current efforts to develop it, and to 
suggest ways of overcoming these shortcomings by a systematic examination of the 
behavior of nuclear powers and incipient nuclear states
This paper is divided into four parts First, we focus on a set of 
significant shortcomings in nuclear deterrence theory, with an emphasis on 
empirical aspects and the role of systematic, analytic explanation Second, we 
examine the nature of national, unitary actor models of deterrence Third, we 
suggest three questions essential to the development of a theoretical framework 
based on (a) the nature of threat perception, (b) the role of nuclear weapons 
doctrine, and (c) the function of arms control and disarmament policy embedded 
within deterrence policy and strategy These elements establish the basis for 
developing a comparative framework for the cross-national analysis of deterrence 
behavior Finally, we conclude with a set of implications of the proposed 
approach for the theory and practice of deterrence and nuclear policy
Introduction
Current approaches to deterrence theory suffer from several defects 
First, the empirical base on which it rests is fragmented and diffuse We now 
have over thirty years of experience with the United States and the Soviet Union 
as nuclear powers, yet there exists no systematic comparative examination of 
these deterrent systems to determine the principal factors which have shaped 
their development and proposed use Much less are there comparable studies of 
British, French, or Chinese nuclear behavior that attempt to place the 
experience of these states within a common framework of analysis Certainly 
there is a rich storehouse of descriptive material about the superpowers (e g 
Kahan, 1975, Freedman, 1981, Holloway, 1982) Similarly, we have particular 
studies of French (Kohl, 1971, Harrison, 1982), British (Pierre, 1972, Freedman, 
1981), and Chinese (Hsieh, 1962) behavior Absent, however, is any attempt to 
furnish evidence and data to explain whether the experience of any one nation is 
applicable to that of other nuclear power or incipient nuclear states In the 
absence of systematic data collection, guided by a concern to explain nuclear 
deterrence behavior across national systems, comparisons among nuclear states 
will be difficult and confident theory building will be all but impossible
Second, many deterrence theorists confuse advocacy with explanation The 
work of Herman Kahn (Kahn 1960, 1965) and, more recently, the writing of Colin 
Gray (Gray, 1981, Gray and Payne, 1983) fall into this category They are 
concerned with the policy problems of deterrence breakdown and nuclear war 
fighting and termination For these analysts only a nuclear war-fighting 
strategy will provide a credible deterrent Their opponents are no less
restrained in relying on untested versions of deterrence theories to promote 
alternative policies, like MAD (E g Keeny and Panofsky, 1981/82)
These policy oriented analysts, whether they are for more or less nuclear 
arms, share a common quality deterrence theory is conceived as a means to
advance policy preferences rather than a theory that remains to be built in 
order to guide policy choices There is little or no interest among these 
analysts to carefully examine the behavior of nuclear powers and the constraints 
under which they act as a precondition for policy-making One might as well 
recommend cures for malaria before understanding what produces the disease 
Some of the cures might well work, but explaining why they work would not be 
easy In the case of the international deterrence system, where the risk is at 
an all-time high, it is imperative that scientific understanding of deterrence 
behavior take precedence over policy prescriptions grounded solely on normative 
grounds
Third, some analysts confine themselves principally to heuristic models to 
explain deterrence behavior while shunning empirical investigation Empirical 
references are selectively chosen to illustrate, not demonstrate, a point or 
proposition that is presented as self-evident These modelers focus principally 
on the behavior of presumed antagonists Deterrence behavior is viewed as a 
derivative of their competitive and conflict relationships Other limiting 
factors shaping these conflictual patterns— economic resources, technological 
capabilities, alliance ties, or internal political constraints that are unique 
to the actors— are ignored or slighted in the interest of simplifying analysis
Fourth, there is also absent from much of the literature on deterrence a 
shared operational definition of what deterrence is and how it is applicable to 
all nuclear powers or potential nuclear states The unwarranted assumption is
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made that analysts, even those at odds with each other, have a common 
understanding of nuclear deterrence Nothing, of course, could be further from 
the truth Nuclear deterrence is only one, albeit critical, dimension of a rich 
psychological literature concerned with deterrence as a general behavioral 
phenomenon in human affairs Few analysts have seriously come to terms with 
this larger literature on deterrence theory (An exception is Jervis, 1976) 
Critical distinctions between deterrence and defense (Snyder, 1961) or 
deterrence and compellence (Schelling, 1966 and Baldwin, 1979) have yet to be 
fully explored Controversy over the moral implications of deterrence has added 
to our confusion and has become an additional source of discord among deterrence 
theorists (Green, 1966, Stregenga, 1983) Since so much hangs on deterrence as 
a concept and as a policy option— now raised to a style of national life— it is 
no wonder that it should be invested with so many diverse meanings, each 
legitimate in its way, but confusing when the context and scope of these various 
meanings of deterrence are precisely defined
In light of these considerations, the following discussion attempts to 
develop a different, if not entirely new, approach to the study of nuclear 
deterrence It has two over-all aims to develop a conceptual framework, based 
on comparative analysis and systematic empirical study, to describe and explain 
the deterrence policies and behavior of nuclear powers and to suggest, partly on 
the strength of better understanding of how deterrence is practiced, why nuclear 
deterrence fails— or might fail with potentially disastrous results for all 
participants While the discussion is most concerned with states possessing 
nuclear arms and military systems, it is cast in broad enough terms to include 
(1) two states with a reputed nuclear capability (India and Israel) which have 
not yet developed nuclear weapon systems, (2) incipient nuclear states, like
Pakistan and South Africa, which are reportedly pursuing military nuclear 
options, and (3) states, like West Germany, which are heavily engaged in nuclear 
diplomacy although they have renounced the right to acquire nuclear arms
Various considerations prompt the casting of so broad a net Although 
India has not publicly launched a weapons program, insisting on the peaceful 
character of its nucler explosion in 1974, the possibility of developing a 
military capability presents a constant threat to Pakistan whose own program is 
shaped by prudent regard for India's superior technological and industrial 
capacity which is able to produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems (Cohen, 
1982)
Israel may be considered a nuclear state because of its reported ability to 
explode a nuclear device even though it apparently has not done so (Harkavy, 
1977, and Feldman, 1983) West Germany is also treated as an incipient nuclear 
power Although precluded from developing its own nuclear weapons, it exports 
sophisticated civilian nuclear technology and, with thousands of nuclear weapons 
on its territory, it has developed a subtle and complex diplomacy to gain access 
through the Atlantic Alliance to allied nuclear protection It has also 
actively engaged in nuclear arms control and disarmament bargaining, with its 
allies and with the Soviet Union, in an effort to shape European and global 
security arrangements to suit its needs and interests
This discussion is divided into three sections The first briefly sketches 
the principal assumptions underlying classical deterrence theory and underscores 
the useful, but limited, focus of the studies cast in these terms Also 
outlined is an alternative paradigm for the study of deterrence It proposes a 
broader conception of deterrence, linked to its domestic determinants, that 
amplifies and extends previous theory and research Part two suggests some of
7the important implications of the anticipated research findings for students of 
deterrence and for policy-makers The final section focuses on the question of 
the reliability of deterrence systems and how formal modeling of these systems 
might assist our attempts to predict their behavior under varied assumptions of 
operation Specifically addressed are the requirements of deterrence as 
functions of alliance cooperation and cohesion and of domestic political 
bargaining
Dominant Deterrence Models Nation-States, Unitary Actors 
The dominant models currently relied on to explain nuclear deterrence are 
derived largely from the early work of theorists in the 1950s and 1960s 
Seminal studies by Thomas Schelling (1960, 1966), Herman Kahn (1960, 1965), 
William Kaufmann (1954), Bernard Brodie (1946, 1959), and Glenn H Snyder
(1961), et al emphasize the role of the state as a unitary actor, seeking, 
through the manipulation of nuclear threats, to maximize security values by 
discouraging an adversary from attacking its vital interests With some 
exceptions (e g Schelling, 1960), early analysts assumed perfect knowledge of 
the consequences of all moves that might be taken in threatening or using 
nuclear weapons Rational conduct prescribes that actors will calculate the 
costs and benefits of perceived options and will adopt that mode of action which 
will maximize security values A potential aggressor is deterred if the costs 
of an attack exceed the expected value of resorting to force Even when these 
heroic assumptions are relaxed, there is still the expectation that nations 
pursuing a policy of nuclear deterrence will behave in logically ordered ways
The approach of first-wave theorists prescinds from the actual behavior of 
nuclear states It sets out the parameters of expected state behavior
8Historical experience, as already suggested, is used primarily for illustrative 
and heuristic purposes rather than as the source or basis for the analysis 
Little is said of the actual technological, military, or economic limits that 
define a state's nuclear capabilities These frictions, as Clausewitz might 
have said, are suspended in developing models of perfect rationality in 
threatening or using nuclear weapons
Second, early deterrence analysts abstracted from the domestic political 
environment out of which deterrence policy arose The policy-making process was 
postulated as a black box from which similar patterns of deterrence behavior 
emerge from different states regardless of regime or national differences 
States were pictured as disembodied actors expected to act according to 
discoverable rules of general applicability This assumption, however useful 
for logical analysis and rigor, depreciates the significance of what actual 
opponents, working within defined constraints, do that might deviate from 
prescribed modes o^ deterrence behavior
What is particularly absent from these early writings on which we are still 
dependent is a sense of the different and divergent development of national 
deterrence strategies While early theorists certainly recognized the dynamic, 
evolutionary quality of deterrence (Kahn, 1960, Brodie, 1958), they tended to 
see changes in doctrine and weapons systems as driven primarily by the conflict 
relationship animating the superpowers Deterrence was viewed as a function of 
externally determined forces in which the domestic decision-making process and 
the technological, economic, political, and even psychological restraints under 
which that process operated were ignored or slighted
There have been several noteworthy attempts to go beyond this perspective 
and improve our theoretical understanding and practical knowledge of deterrence
9Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing (1977) sought to establish an empirical basis for 
deterrence by examining the crisis behavior of selected states over the last 
century Ned Lebow (1981) followed a similar approach in his examination of 
deterrence breakdowns over this same period From a different perspective, 
Alexander George and Richard Smoke (1974) attempted to build a theory of 
deterrence by generalizing from American behavior under crisis conditions
These efforts, while useful and insightful, do not go far enough They 
have tended to narrow deterrence to the notion of crisis management They have 
largely addressed the question of deterring a disarming attack rather than 
examining the use of deterrence as an instrument of a nation's diplomacy or 
systemic objectives Analysis of nuclear deterrence has tended to be 
dissociated from this larger international setting and process and to be 
portrayed as largely independent of it (Morgan, 1977, pp 9-76)
The work of Graham Allison (1971) and Erving Janis (1982) were useful 
correctives, but these approaches committed the opposite error of downgrading 
the importance of real threats as critical components of the decisional 
framework of nuclear strategists charged with shaping a state's nuclear 
policies Allison's case study is useful in calling attention to organizational 
behavior and bureaucratic politics as determinants of deterrence signalling and 
bargaining But it focused too narrowly on crisis management and on the 
behavior of only one actor, the United States, with only speculative asides 
about Soviet intentions Janis' work only treats U S responses His analysis 
of mind-sets is useful, but, like Allison, he tell us little about the validity 
of perceptions of external threats and their impact on a state's deterrent 
posture and the limits that they place on a state's strategic options One 
would have to range more widely than these analysts to find an answer to these
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vital questions
One place to begin is to stipulate, at least at a general level of 
analysis, that there are key components of nuclear deterrent policy that may be 
predicated of any nuclear power These may be framed the form of three 
questions, which are central to first-wave deterrence theorists First, how do 
the state and various political actors within it define threats to the state’s 
security7 Second, how do they translate these perceived threats into nuclear 
doctrine, force levels, and weapon systems to respond to these threats7 And, 
third, how do they define the state's nuclear arms control and disarmament 
policies to complement its strategic doctrine and posture7 Responses to these 
questions constitute the key components of a state's deterrence strategy When 
viewed as a whole, they are assumed to represent the state's operational 
strategy for the use, threat, and control of nuclear weapons
Figures 1 and 2 suggest two contrasting paradigms that explain deterrence 
behavior These paradigms may be compared along three dimensions (1) the
decision-making characteristics of the actor or deterrer, (2) the causal links 
posited among the three sub-domains of deterrence —  threats, doctrine and 
nuclear weapons, and arms control policies, and (3) the determinants of change 
or stability of a state's deterrence policy, including the role played by the 
adversary's behavior 
Actor Characteristics
Early deterrence theorists answered the three questions, noted above, by 
appealing to an externally driven model of opponent interaction Figure 1
represents this mode of decision and adversary interaction in the form of a 
unitary actor which is largely free from internal resources constraints or 
conflicts over ends and means Only the adversary is the restraining and
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defining factor of a state*s deterrence policies and behavior The model is 
especially helpful in defining for the analyst or decision-maker the logical 
steps which must be taken in constructing a viable deterrent policy It says 
nothing about the ability of the actors to take those steps, to marshall 
resources and internal support to mount an effective deterrence posture, or to 
resist competing claims for resources in pursuit of other estimable objectives, 
like conventional military strategies or welfare demands
Figure 1 depicts the state as a unitary actor, with homogeneous and 
consistent values Decisions are made in a politically frictionless world 
through logical, cognitive processes The object of each decision is the 
maximization of national security values These decisions and their
consequences are assumed to be essentially compatible with decisions arising 
from other policy domains Clear priorities are set among policy domains and 
the most efficient and efficacious means are chosen to achieve defined goals
An alternate way of looking at deterrence, suggested by Figure 2, is to 
view the policies of nuclear powers and incipient nuclear states as the product 
of several key variables that include but that are not limited to the level and 
scope of the conflict between the antagonists as such These include not only 
the perception of exterior threats and the conflict relations defining adversary 
behavior but also the domestic political processes of the antagonists and the 
valuational and resource allocation choices made through those processes as well 
as the economic, technological, and psychological constraints under which a 
state's decisional process must operate Figure 2 sketches this larger field of 
action and decision as determinants of a state*s deterrence policies It 
assumes a non—unitary actor with heterogeneous and often inconsistent values 
Decisions are made through a political process characterized by competition
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among individuals and groups within and outside the government Bargaining and 
negotiation are central features of governmental decision-making The process 
yields a continuing chain of optimizing decisions, reflecting compromises 
among the claims of diverse and often divergent groups and individuals bent on 
promoting differing security and non-security interests, values, and often 
conflicting policy proposals to advance those interests and values
One must first assume that the state, even totalitarian regimes, are not 
completely unitary Even in this limiting case purges are necessary to assure 
loyalty to the regime and responsiveness to the whims of the leadership (cf 
Arendt, 1951) If a unitary actor is not assumed, expected state behavior will 
be seen to be linked to some degree, to domestic political factors defined by 
coalition-building imperatives within the state's governmental process These 
will vary in significance and salience from state to state In open societies, 
where political patticipation is broad and access to decisional centers 
decentralized and diffuse coalition-building and public support for deterrence 
will be crucial fir the long-term success of the state's deterrence policies, 
for authoritarian regimes, not limited by group constraints, these 
considerations will count for little or nothing in the calculations of 
decision-makers, although, as already suggested, they may become important 
during domestic thaws Witness, for example, the post-Stalin period 
Decision-making also operates under defined economic and technological 
constraints which vary over time for different states Even a strong and 
willful leader —  Stalin, Mao or de Gaulle —  will be unable to overcome these 
constraints simply by fiat
Early theorist models tended to put the cart before the horse Rules of 
behavior are posited as a logical deduction from implied constraints intrinsic
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to nuclear weapons and not from the political, economic, technological, and 
psychological restraints within which deterrence policies arose Early 
theorist's more satisfying approach, one conceivably capable of yielding more 
reliable results than early deterrence theory, is to begin with some general 
notion of actual deterrence behavior that meets a provisional test of common 
sense and universal experience Such an approach implies a domestic political 
process, marked by a uniquely national distribution of authority and power that 
allocates values within a society It also assumes that the process is bound by 
economic, technological, and psychological constraints within which decisions 
are made and values are distributed The analyst should first begin with a 
description and explanation of nuclear behavior and base that prescription on 
some notion of testable and verifiable behavior This fact-value distinction is 
obviously more easily stated than achievable in practice Although many
problems are encountered in attempting to maintain this distinction, obscuring 
this distinction does little to advance our ability to explain deterrent 
behavior or to prescribe effective ways to escape the dilemmas posed by nuclear 
weapons
Causal Relations
The two paradigms also sketch different sets of causal relations between 
deterrence sub-domains They suggest the significance of whether or not the 
actor defining policy in these areas is unitary or not Figure 1 presents a 
direct relationship between the actor's perceptions of the external stimulus 
(threat) and his response (doctrine and nuclear weapons) This stimulus and the 
initial response also frame the parameters of the state's arms control and
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disarmament policies Decision-making proceeds sequentially, cumulatively, and 
coherently The state’s deterrence strategy alms at shaping the external 
environment in ways favorable to its security interests and values and is 
focused, specifically, on modifying and controlling adversary behavior
In Figure 2 the competition among multiple domestic actors, characterized 
by heterogeneous values and interests, impacts simultaneously, not sequentially, 
on the three sub-domains of deterrence Decisions flowing from each realm must 
be coordinated and compromised in an effort to approximate a coherent deterrent 
posture Decisions about threats, for example, will not necessarily be linked 
to weapons or arms control accords Aside from cognitive lapses, breakdowns in 
coordination occur simply because different competing coalitions or, in an 
authoritarian system, specialized groups directed by dictatorial fiat are 
concerned with each policy domain The membership of the coalitions of these 
policy sub-domains is overlapping but not congruent This division of political 
labor has critical irplications for the deterrence policies of a state
Figure 2 suggests these counterflows The policy positions of the 
coalitions operating in the three sub-domains of deterrence overlap only at A 
Intersections also occur between two of the sub-domains at B, C, and D, leaving 
the third sub-domain with no input into the decisions flowing from the other 
regions Large areas of the policy formation process within each sub-domain are 
also depicted as non-intersecting These areas are insulated from the other 
deterrence sub-domains although the decisions made within each sector are 
mutually interdependent Participants in each sub-domain of the deterrence 
process, moreover, must compete with participants in other policy domains for 
access to the state's scarce resources whether viewed as coalitional support, 
economic reserves, or technological capabilities Additional uncertainty and
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unpredictability are thus introduced into the deterrence process as it is viewed 
from the broad perspective of the political system as a whole 
Nuclear Deterrence Outcomes
Nuclear deterrence policies, deriving from the processes outlined in 
Figures 1 and 2, are also likely to be different In Figure 1 nuclear policy is 
adversary driven and tends toward a stable equilibrium if the adversary 
cooperates perceived threats are externally determined, doctrine and weapons 
are calibrated to meet threats, and arms control policies are calculated to 
maximize incentives for adversary cooperation or acquiescence The adversary's 
behavior feeds back to the deterring actor's perceptual process and produces a 
reinforcement or relaxation of deterrence to fit the adversary's observed 
response If the deterred party manifests a willingness to cooperate, the 
deterrer presumably evaluates his deterrence policies as successful The stage 
is set either to maintain the equilibrium that has been achieved or to cooperate 
with the adversary to reduce the level of arms or the rate of the arms race If 
the adversary replies m  a belligerent fashion or increases his military 
preparedness, an arms race will very likely result with potentially
destabilizing effects Throughout this process, the deterring actor's nuclear 
policies are externally driven The deterring actor's threats and his 
inclination to increase or decrease arms depend on his perception of the 
behavior of the adversary
Figure 2 portrays deterrence in constant flux with periods of greater or 
lesser stability Change is engendered not only by externally perceived threats 
but also by shifts in the domestic coalitions formed around deterrence issues 
and, more broadly, around those arising in other policy domains Adversary
behavior feeds back into the perceptual process of the deterrer, as in Figure 1,
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but the adversary is also engaged In attempts to influence coalition formation 
within the deterrer's political system These dual forms of adversary response 
and initiative are represented by arrows that run from the adversary to the 
sub-domain coalitions operating within the political system of the deterrer 
Depending on the degree to which decision-making is open or closed, the 
adversary will have access directly to the units and coalitions formulating or 
executing deterrence policy
Figure 2 also depicts how groups and rival coalitions, forming within the 
specific sub-domains of deterrence, seek to control the state's decisions within 
these areas These sub-domains are drawn as spheres to suggest independent 
centers of power Groups within these spheres compete for political support and 
for resources to define the state's nuclear deterrence policies While their 
actions may be initially guided by the same or different perceptions of the 
external threat, Figure 2 suggests that later responses are more heavily 
influenced, and progressively so, by domestic political demands or limits The 
initial reaction to perceived external threats creates a growing number and
variety of interested groups within a state (the military, scientists and
engineers, pressure groups, parties, public opinion, bureaucratic and
governmental elites) who are attuned to nuclear policy As the deterrence 
policy process becomes domesticated and diffuse, the influence of the policy 
process itself and the influence of the competing groups within it help explain 
what otherwise appear to be gaps and inconsistencies in a state's deterrence 
posture From a cognitive or unitary actor perspective, the latter may appear 
illogical, risky, and costly, from the viewpoint of the internal political
process, it may appear to be an understandable and even sensible adjustment to 
domestic political imperatives and to economic and technological constraints
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In the latter Instance, external events appear to account less and less for the 
state's nuclear policies Nuclear policy-making tends to become a 
self-propelled vehicle
An approach to deterrence theory, guided by the schema outlined in Figure 
2, can be useful m  identifying the degree to which the deterrence policies of 
the different states to be examined depart from posited norms of value 
maximizations for security It can also be helpful in specifying the extent to 
which these variances are related to the domestic political process and the 
resource and perceptual limits under which the political process operates 
Where appropriate, measures can perhaps be constructed to plot how different 
policy processes —  varying in their approximation of a unitary actor model —  
impact on the sub-domains of deterrence and on deterrence generally It will be 
of interest to compare how significant externally perceived threats explain the 
deterrence policies of the states to be studied It will also be worthwhile to 
assess, comparatively, the importance of technological and economic constraints 
in explaining the composition of each state's deterrence policies These lines 
of comparison are suggestive, not exhaustive They provide some indication of 
the possibilities that comparative analysis, based on a model of behavior that 
accounts for operative internal and external factors, can introduce into the 
study of deterrence and the potential contribution that it can make to the 
development of deterrence theory and practice Through such analyses one should 
be able to show why the nuclear deterrence policies of states are the same (a 
key objective of early deterrence theory) and why they differ
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Searching for Answers to Deterrence Three Questions
Some concrete illustrations of how the three questions, noted above, would 
be applied to the study of nuclear power and incipient nuclear states may be 
useful in assessing the merit of a comparative approach that is simultaneously 
sensitive to adversary conflicts and to key factors of decision-making that lie 
within the make-up of the internal political process of a state and the 
constraints shaping that process
Threat Perception
The first question —  how threats are perceived and officially certified —  
lies at the heart of any state's security strategy Threats are defined in
terms of a nation's values (Boulding, 1956) What it holds dear or, more 
concretely, what groups and individuals care about define the range of objects, 
real or imaginen, that are to be protected Threat perceptions are 
intrinsically political acts since they imply some ordering of values and an 
assessment of the degree to which they are at risk Since societies and the 
groups and individuals composing them differ widely over what values are to be 
protected —  and against whom —  a critical part of the domestic struggle for 
power concerns dispute over the government's official definitions of exterior 
threats and the processes of decision and political competition by which those 
threats are defined over time Differences over values and varying estimates of 
risk among participants in the domestic struggle for power inevitably politicize 
the perceptual, cognitive, and decisional process by which definitions of 
threats are governmentally sanctioned
The relation, suggested in Figure 2, between threat perception and a 
state's deterrence policies, does not imply that external threats are
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non-existent or perceptual figments of a nation’s imagination It merely 
recognizes that threats are not defined in a political vacuum What importance 
is attached to them by a state depends to some extent on how well they reflect 
and serve the interests and values of competitors for power within each regime 
Only further research can identify these particular divisions, and the rival 
coalitions implied by them, within the political process of each nuclear power 
or incipient nuclear state
Current research also does not tell us enough about the politics of threat 
perception It provides only a partial image of how threats are perceived, how 
they are defined by governmental and non-governmental groups, and how, 
eventually, they are officially defined, if at all, by governmental 
decision-makers (Jervis, 1976) In some societies, such as the United States, 
elites characteristically differ sharply over the nature of the external threat 
and its saliency The decentralized character of the American political system, 
animated by the activity of divergent groups, each claiming access and influence 
over governmental policy, encourages a politics of threat perceptions that is 
fluid and fissiparous Governmental policy, reflecting the rival
interpretations of external threat that may be held by contending groups within 
the society and often within the government itself, often appears deliberately 
vague and contradictory (Wolfe, 1979) During the early Truman period, for 
example, at least four different tendencies can be discerned One group viewed 
Soviet behavior in the same optimistic light that had guided World War II 
strategy (the Wallacites) A second group perceived major differences between 
the American and Soviet security priorities, but sought accommodation on 
traditional big power grounds (e g  Walter Lippmann and Henry Stimson) A third 
group expected the ideological thrust of Soviet policy to dissipate if American
b.
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policy, guided by a strategy of containment, did nothing to fuel it (Kennan, 
Forrestal, Acheson et al ) A fourth cluster of opinion viewed the Soviet Union 
as a demonic power implacably opposed to Western values (McCarthy, Dulles)
These same perceptual and political differences, with varying degree of 
intensity and impact, are detectable in the development of the security policies 
of the other nuclear powers and incipient nuclear states, like West Germany 
The Soviet shift to a posture of peaceful co-existence appears to have been 
occasioned by Khrushchev's ascendancy to Kremlin leadership Communist Chinese 
assessment of the American and Soviet threat paralleled the fortunes of the 
Maoist regime and those of its successors West German public opinion and 
governmental signalling about the Soviet threat are not predictable simply as a 
function of evolving Soviet nuclear capabilities Soviet military power has 
never been greater nor have German reservations about nuclear modernization in 
NATO, evidenced by the debate over threatre nuclear weapons, been more 
pronounced than they are today The French Fourth and Fifth Republics differed 
sharply in their interpretations of the Soviet challenge and the American-Soviet 
nuclear balance (Kolodziej, 1974, 1982) Indian perception of external threats 
also vacillated between China and Pakistan during the 1960s, partly as a result 
of internal divisions within Indian politics
Doctrine and Nuclear Weapons
Research on the second question to be examined in each case study —  how 
each state defines its military doctrine and nuclear needs —— can be expected to 
show that there is often no clear connection between officially defined threats 
and the military strategies pursued by nuclear states A nation's operational 
nuclear strategy and the nuclear arms it disposes appear to be critically shaped
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by the political choices that are made in allocating scarce technological and 
economic resources between nuclear and nonnuclear military capabilities and 
between defense and nondefense programs These decisions appear to be only 
partly influenced by external perceptions of threat The New Look posture of 
the Eisenhower administration was based on a perception of the Soviet military 
threat that differed little from its predecessor's assessment What changed 
were estimates of the capacity of the American economy to support large defense 
expenditures Military spending beyond $35-40 billion annually was ruled out to 
preclude economic dislocation and runaway inflation, perceived as a more 
immediate danger than Soviet militarism Eight years later the Kennedy
administration, attached to Keynesian notions of economic growth and full 
employment, raised the plateau of defense spending as a stimulant to a lagging 
economy, although the missile gap and Soviet military ascendancy had disappeared
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as perceived problems The Reagan administration's pursuit of a war-fighting 
strategy and its efforts to close the so-called window of vulnerability are 
limited as much by growing governmental and trade deficits as by domestic 
opposition in principle to its nuclear modernization programs
The development of France's force de dissuasion evolved along a direct, 
linear path despite diametrically opposed projections of external threat under 
the Fourth and Fifth Republics (Kohl, 1969) The French triad of Mirage IVs, 
IRBMs, and nuclear submarines advanced more in lockstep with French progress in 
military technology and governmental commitment to a fixed rate of expenditures 
for defense, occasioned by deeply felt welfare needs, than in response to 
shifting definitions of threats (Kolodziej, 1982)
The British, Indian, Soviet, Chinese, and Israeli nuclear programs also 
face obvious technological and economic constraints whose precise limits must be
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set by the domestic political process Choices must be made In allocating 
resources among competing military claims and between defense and welfare needs 
Research Is likely to show that the size, pace, and direction of the nuclear 
programs of these states are partial derivatives of the structure of Internal 
political support and opposition enjoyed by different public spending programs 
Since these states also depend on foreign technical and economic assistance in 
developing their nuclear systems, groups, parties, and government officials must 
also choose between competing foreign and security alignments to gain access to 
needed foreign aid 
Arms Control and Disarmament
Progress in understanding deterrence is also anticipated by seeking answers 
to the third question posed by this research proposal the domestic 
determinants of the arms control and disarmament policies of the nuclear powers 
and incipient nuclear states Changes in Communist leadership, first from 
Joseph Stalin to h kita Khrushchev and then from Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev, 
have had a profound impact on superpower nuclear competition and cooperation 
Khrushchev*s recognition of the destructive power of nuclear weapons prompted 
the peaceful co-existence doctrine of the late 1950s It also set the stage a 
decade later for Brezhnev's acceptance of SALT I and II as a partial check on 
internal pressures for greater long-range nuclear capabilities to implement a 
war-fighting strategy (Holloway, 1982) Changes m  American administrations 
have also had an important influence on United States arms control and 
disarmament policies The Nixon administration, facing strong domestic 
criticism of its Vietnam policies, signed the SALT I treaty, partly to disarm 
opponents at home Less than a decade later, another Republican administration, 
acting on its heightened perception of the Soviet military threat, refused to
kk
23
ratify the SALT II treaty and launched an ABM research program that risks 
undermining the SALT I accord
Viewed from still another angle, it appears that internal bargaining 
between civilian and military bureaucracies within the Soviet Union and the 
United States resulted in compromises that opened the way for a new generation 
of nuclear weapons to be introduced into the superpower arsenals during the 
1970s (Newhouse, 1973, Talbot, 1979, and Smith, 1980) SALT I and II can be 
interpreted as a restraint on the arms race and, paradoxically, as an agreed 
upon mutual expansion of superpower nuclear striking power negotiated by elites 
on both sides with their respective governments as a condition for their support 
of the treaties
Less is known about the domestic sources of Chinese, Indian, and Israeli 
nuclear policies than those of the superpowers There is evidence to suggest, 
however, that the process of domestic determination of these states' threat 
perceptions, military strategies and nuclear policies is significant (risieh, 
1962, Cohen and Park, 1978, Marwah, 1977, Harkavy, 1977, and Feldman, 1982) 
The American-Chinese rapprochement came at the height of American military 
engagement in Southeast Asia and was apparently prompted in no small part by 
profound domestic political changes occurring within the two countries Indian 
pursuit of a nuclear program, while certainly a response to the threats posed by 
Pakistan and by Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons, is not divorced from 
elite politics within India The growth of a nationally motivated technocratic 
class has swelled support for an enhanced Indian security role in South Asia and 
in global arms control policy-making While Israel's decision to develop a 
nuclear program has never been challenged by any Israeli political group, the 
policy implications of this program have been a matter of open controversy with
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clear political overtones for more than a decade The decision of the Likud 
government to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 sparked a fiery debate 
along party lines
Towards a Mathematical Model of the Non-Unitary Actors Paradigm
On the basis of the conceptual framework described above it is possible to 
formulate a mathematical model of the non-unitary deterrer actor in order to 
derive a set of propositions Moreover, formalization of the proposed model 
allows the theoretical derivation of aspects and properties of the model which 
might not be apparent from our informal description of the non-unitary deterrer 
actor
The central focus of the proposed approach lies in the estimation of the 
degree to which a viable deterrence policy, i e one that indeed prevents 
aggression, in fact emerges as a national policy output We can call such a 
variable the reliability of deterrence policy As such, it is a function of 
(1) the reliability with which the deterrer actor perceives the external 
aggressive threat, (2) the reliability with which the actor is capable of 
formulating a coherent nuclear doctrine with appropriate force levels and 
weapons systems, and (3) the reliability with which it is capable of designing 
an arms control and disarmament policy Since a key aspect of the proposed 
model is that all three requirements must reliably occur in order for a policy 
of deterrence to emerge, it follows that the overall reliability of deterrence 
can be modelled as 
(1) R = P D A,
where P is the reliability of threat perception, D is the reliability of the 
nuclear doctrine, and A is the reliability of the arms control policy Each
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reliability is a probability measure on a scale of 0 to 1
In turn, each of the three component reliabilities is grounded on the
viability or survivability of the corresponding domestic and allied coalitions 
Let , , and denote the number of key, pivotal actors in each of these three
coalitions, and let q, r, and s denote the reliability of each actor in the 
corresponding coalition The equation 1 can be re written as
(2 )  P -  q
(3) D = r
(4) A = s
and
(5) R = q r s
Equation 5 describes one possible formalization of the proposed framework 
However, time — in particular the role of political change in the domestic
structure of the actor—  plays no role since the model is thus far static A 
final step in the basic formulation of a mathematical model consistent with the 
thrust of the proposed paradigm is to make the six basic variables 
time-dependent, perhaps drive by additional factors which can m  turn be modeled 
separately or taken from existing models in the literature
While in the present paper it is not possible to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the proposed model (see Cioffi-Revilla 1983a, 1983b, Cioffi-Revilla 
and Kolodziej, 1983, for some analytic properties of this class of model), it is
nonetheless possible to state (without proof) some results with implications for
past theory and further research First, the multiplicative structure of 
deterrence relaibility in the non-unitary actor model yields a reliability 
behavior which is frequently far from intuitive expectation In particular, 
overall deterrence reliability R is extremely sensitive to changes in any one of
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the six variables affecting it In all but trivial cases, partial changes in 
the component reliabilities q, r, s, as well as in the number and structural 
arrangement of coalition actors, have non-linear, amplified effects on overall 
reliability
Second, the effects of changes in component reliabilities are qualitatively 
quite different from the effects of changes in the number and structure of 
supporting coalitions In particular, the later are more complex and,
mathematically, are governed by a logarithmic law This implies that empirical 
estimates used in policy analysis can ignore these difference only at the grave 
risk of gross miscalculation
Third, the dynamic analysis of equation 5 demonstrates that, over time, the 
overall reliabilit} of deterrent policy follows a trajectory which in all but 
trivial cases [e g q(t) = r(t) = s(t) = 1 0 or constant] is very different from 
what one might intuitively expect In essence, if the static analysis of 
deterrence reliaba1Lty is already governed by non-linear effects, these eftects 
unfold in a very rich and diverse set of possible longitudinal trajectories 
Additionally, most analyses of dynamic reliability in deterrence policies and 
systems must be carried out by computer simulation since the mathematical 
treatment can pose significant problems 
Applying a Comparative Framework
An explicit caveat should be entered at this point about the applicability 
of the research design sketched in Figure 2 to all nuclear powers or incipient 
nuclear states Access to needed data and decision-makers will obviously differ 
from one country study to another Soviet and Chinese leaders are not
accessible to interview More accessible are the elites in open societies, like 
Israel and India —  and still more so those in the United States or among the
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Western nuclear powers Secondary literature will have to be primarily used for 
Communist states where the influence of rival coalitions seeking to influence 
national nuclear policy normally can only be estimated In the case of West 
Germany, India, and Israel, moreover, research on the actual development of 
military nuclear capabilities and doctrines must necessarily be limited West 
Germany has renounced any right to produce nuclear weapons, India insists its 
explosion of a nuclear device was for peaceful purposes, and Israel officially 
refuses to acknowledge its nuclear status
These and other obstacles to full comparative treatment should not be 
exaggerated Precisely because of these differences among the deterrence 
postures of nuclear and incipient nuclear states, it is useful to mount a 
comparative study that identifies the range of differences and similarities 
There is no reason to abandon the progress already made in developing a general 
theory of deterrence There is every reason, however, to strengthen this effort 
by careful study of the behavior of nuclear and nonnuclear states engaged in 
nuclear strategy and diplomacy and to generalize about that experience Such 
knowledge should shed important light on how deterrence actually operates at the 
regional and global level and how these fragile deterrence regimes are linked, 
positively or negatively, to the domestic political settings of each country
Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence of an Empirically Based 
Comparative Approach to Nuclear Policy
Anticipated research findings are, potentially, of considerable theoretical 
and practical importance Only some highlights can be suggested here If it is 
true that deterrence is increasingly domesticated, then students and 
practitioners of deterrence will have to concern themselves increasingly with
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domestic actors —  individuals, groups, bureaucratic elites, and government 
officials —  if they wish to understand or influence the deterrence policies of 
a state It is doubtless true that the delicate balance of terror depends on 
having the correct mix of nuclear capabilities (Wohlstetter, 1959) A strong 
case can also be made, however, that the balance hinges critically on the 
stability of the domestic politics of nuclear states and on the finely spun 
internal political arrangements that have been precariously stitched together by 
these states to guide the strategies governing their threat, use, and control of 
nuclear weapons
The beneficial or harmful effects of this domestication process, if 
established, are not clear One can wonder, for example, whether the widely 
held view of Saajel P Huntington, Jr (1961) about American politics and 
national security still holds Huntington argued that the diffusion of 
political power and authority m  the United States, notwithstanding ita costs 
and inconveniences encourages realistic and responsive, if untidy, national 
defense policies According to Huntington, the open character of the American 
system tends to ensure that all available options for resolving the nation's 
security problems will be eventually explored although rarely in a systematic or 
comprehensive manner
In other words, Huntington advances the intriguing argument, contesting de 
Tocqueville's often repeated pessimism about democracies and foreign policy, 
that the very non-unitary character of the American political process and, 
specifically, of its arms control and security domains are more positively 
related to desired security outcomes than those which might be expected from 
political systems approaching the model of a unitary actor Huntington's 
argument may be framed as a proposition a non-unitary policy process (Figure
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2) of the American or democratic type acts more rationally than an actor who is 
ostensibly more unified (Figure 1), such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union 
Huntington implicitly makes the useful distinction that there is no necessary 
relation between a unitary political system —  or one approaching it —  and 
rational behavior Indeed, democracies may do better than we believe in 
approximating rational defense decision-making, understood as the maximization 
of security values
While more research and analysis requested are needed to assess these 
claims over a range of states, the American case suggests that the political 
process may encourage security policy outcomes that are neither intended nor 
desirable The fiercely competitive nature of American politics may have 
unwittingly contributed to the development of increasingly higher levels of 
defense spending and the acquisition of nuclear capabilities As one
administration decreases the rate or level of spending for nuclear arms (eg 
the Eisenhower and Carter administrations), it opens itself to attacks from 
partisan opponents A new administration then feels obliged to increase 
expenditures for nuclear weapons (e g the Kennedy and Reagan administrations) 
The ironic result is a United States in a race with itself, with potentially 
damaging consequences for international security The arms race with the Soviet 
Union is fueled with the result that uncontrolled vertical proliferation
potentially stimulates horizontal proliferation among nonnuclear states
Divisions within American politics and the decentralization of American 
political decision-making, while suited to the task of dampening internal
conflict and preserving personal liberty, may be less suited to the pursuit of
effective military strategies and arms control accords It is difficult for 
Americans themselves, and no less for foreign observers, to determine precisely
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where the center of political gravity in the United States is currently on a 
range of critical security and arms control issues on shared conceptions of 
the Soviet threat (whether Soviet leaders are pragmatic or demonic), on nuclear 
deterrence (war-fighting vs MAD), levels and composition of nuclear forces (MX, 
B-l, Trident, etc ), and willingness to negotiate accords on nuclear systems 
( zero option vs zero plus or missile delivery systems vs warheads) The 
inability of the United States to sustain over time accord on nuclear policy may 
mislead an adversary about his opponent's resolve to defend his interests 
(Schelling, 1966, pp 35-91) The adversary may be encouraged to exploit an 
opponent's domestic divisions, occasioned by splits that arise in areas other 
than security affairs The signalling of intent may be muted or directed 
because of conflict m  these nonsecurity domains
If sending clear and steady signals is a problem for the deterring party, 
it is evident that, or the target state, correctly interpreting them amidst the 
noise of his oppo <_nt's domestic politics may prompt serious miscalculation 
Economic strife dnd domestic turmoil during the 1930s in the Western 
democracies, as A J P Taylor suggests (1962), encouraged the expansionist 
policies of Hitler's Germany Alternatively, a government whose control is 
internally threatened may have incentive to create or complicate a foreign 
crisis to enhance its domestic position The recent war over the Falkland 
Islands suggests both sets of incentives were at play British vacillation and 
ambiguity emboldened Argentinian irredentism, the military junta's seizure of 
the Falkland Islands appeared to be a move to bolster its eroding popular 
support since destroyed by the British defeat
Viewed as an extension of the domestic struggle for power, deterrence 
appears more complex and unpredictable than analysts have otherwise imagined
Adversaries and allies have difficulty discerning another nation’s nuclear 
intentions and commitments since the coalition constructed to rule a nation may 
be suited to one purpose— winning an election, responding to the bureaucratic 
demands of the military establishment, or implementing new economic 
policies— but damaging to the maintenance of stable deterrence and arms control 
regimes The German election of early 1983 was widely interpreted as a victory 
for the Reagan administration's zero option position while in Germany 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl stressed the view that the election was fought over 
economic policy with security issues playing an important but definitely 
secondary role (Bulletin, 1982, pp 1-7) French, Soviet, and American 
governmental statements, however, so concentrated on the security dimension of 
the election (New York Times, 1983, pp 1, 4) that NATO allies and Soviet 
officials risked drawing misleading conclusions about German domestic support 
for American and Western alliance nuclear policies
Another significant relationship susceptible to clarification through 
comparative research, focused on the actual not presumed behavior of nuclear 
states, is that between the development of science and military technology, on 
one hand, and national strategic doctrines, on the other The experience of the 
Western democracies and the Soviet Union suggests that often unforeseen and 
fortuitous progress in technical areas, such as small, high-speed computers, has 
spurred the development of new weapons, such as the cruise missile, even before 
a use or requirement had been specified for them or a coherent strategy to use 
and control them had been developed (Huisken, 1981) In a similar vein, the 
French government's assignment of tactical nuclear weapons to its ground, sea, 
and air forces appears to be more a move to preserve interservice harmony than a 
response to likely military contingencies The short range of the Army's Pluton
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missile, when fired from French soil where they are based, assures that it will 
strike West Germany, not Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union
The basis for cohesion or conflict among national elites over the 
components of deterrence policy can also be explored through comparative
analysis Domestic differences over nuclear strategy appear to lie more within 
the social fabric, historical experience, and values of competing groups than do 
differences over the specific features of strategic policy or the level of 
nuclear capabilities that should be created American, British, and German
elites are divided over their state's nuclear policies Israeli, Soviet, and 
Chinese leaders appear less split over them Where these conflicts occur, a 
state's nuclear strategy may be vulnerable to foreign influence either directly 
or through the pressures that domestic groups may be able to exert on their 
governments The dramatic appearance of French President Francois Mitterrand
before the West Gei. man election on March 6 1982, was designed to strengthen the 
position of the CDU on the theatre nuclear force issue just as Soviet
blandishments appeared calculated to favor the SPD
It will be of some interest to know how the nuclear policies of foreign 
states are internalized within the domestic political processes of nuclear and 
incipient nuclear states and what the implications of this internalization are 
The French case seems to have had a greater impact on India, Israel, and China 
than either superpower example The defiant nationalism and assertion of 
political independence underlying French nuclear policy may be an important 
stimulus to proliferation As Yehezkel Dror (1980) reminds us, many countries 
in the developing world do not have the same revulsion toward nuclear weapons 
and war as many groups have in Western countries These national and ethnic 
differences weigh very heavily in any plausible scheme for limiting the nuclear
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arms race or for stabilizing regional and global deterrence systems For 
example, Pakistani elites, however much they may be divided on domestic policy, 
agree on the need for an Islamic bomb or at least the capability of producing 
one to deter both India's potential nuclear forces and its dominant conventional 
ones (Cohen, 1982)
These illustrations advise a close look at the domestic determinants of the 
deterrence policies of nuclear powers and incipient nuclear states A 
comparative study of these domestic determinants can help in specifying the key 
political actors, stress points, and political supports for current deterrence 
systems at the regional and global level Such knowledge is a precondition for 
the development of realistic policies that can stabilize the nuclear arms race, 
reduce nuclear armi» on all sides to manageable and less threatening levels, and 
open the way to a diminution in tensions and political conflict Making 
deterrence work and keeping it under tight and responsible political controls 
imply the active participation not only of governments but also of the political 
coalitions on which their power and authority rest
1
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